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I. INTRODUCTION
Native American tribes present unique problems to American
jurisprudence and governance. Unquestionably subject to federal
control on some levels, they have maintained the "inherent powers of
a limited sovereignty" over internal affairs.' While both the Supreme
Court 2 and Congress 3 have recognized this sovereignty, specific Con-
gressional mandate can abrogate it at any time. This Note addresses
the question of whether Congress has mandated federal jurisdiction
over all serious crimes committed by Indians4 against other Indians
on tribal land.
The story is long and complicated, with its beginnings5 in the
1883 Supreme Court case Ex parte Crow Dog, in which the Court
declared that the United States could not prosecute intra-tribal
crimes committed on tribal land.6 Alarm in Congress over the per-
ceived gap in law enforcement led to the Major Crimes Act,7 which
listed certain intra-tribal offenses as falling under federal jurisdiction
for prosecution. 8 Specific enumeration begged the question that still
rages in the circuit courts: whether Congress intended tho list to
stand for the full extent of federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal crimes,
or whether other generally applicable federal criminal statutes could
also be used to prosecute intra-tribal crimes that take place on tribal
land. The circuit courts have fallen into essentially two camps, one
favoring tribal jurisdiction and the other supporting federal jurisdic-
tion.9
1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (photo. reprint 1986) (1942).
2. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) ('CThe Indian nations had
always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights .... ).
3. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916) ("[T]he policy reflected by the
legislation of Congress... [is] that the relations of the Indians among themselves ... is to be
controlled by the customs and laws of the tribe ... !).
4. This Note refers to Native Americans as "Indians" for convenience, as nearly all the
materials cited refer to the group in this way. The author intends no disrespect.
5. See B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues
in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 468-69
(1998).
6. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
5. The list of included offenses currently covers fourteen specific crimes, last expanded in
1986. See id.
9. Although there has not been a great amount of scholarly work done on this issue,
commentators who have addressed the problem have generally found no federal jurisdiction
1480 [Vol. 52:1479
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The pro-tribal group of circuit courts includes the Second,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, whose decisions generally follow the
traditional reading of the statute, first suggested by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Quiver, that "enumeration. . . of certain
offenses as applicable to Indians in the reservations carries with it
some implication of a purpose to exclude others."'10 The Fourth Circuit
adopted this reasoning in its purest form, stating that "[w]hen there
is a crime by an Indian against another Indian within Indian country
only those offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act may be tried
in the federal courts."" The Second12 and the Seventh 3 Circuits have
adopted a less stringent approach, allowing an exception that extends
federal jurisdiction for "peculiarly Federal" crimes. 14 These circuits
operate on the assumption of tribal sovereignty and require the fed-
eral government to demonstrate its authority to prosecute non-
enumerated intra-tribal offenses.' 5
In contrast, the Sixth, 16 Eighth, 7 Ninth' and Tenth 9 Circuits
all adopted postures that presume federal predominance for crimes
covered by generally applicable federal statutes.20 Each of these cir-
over non-enumerated crimes. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: A Journey Through A Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503, 540 (1976) ('CThe
crimes enumerated in [the Major Crimes Act] are exclusive in that a federal district court only
has jurisdiction to entertain charges against Indians which are brought for one of the 14 speci-
fied crimes.'); Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 333 (1989) ('Tribal courts have exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over Indian defendants for all crimes not covered by.. . the Major Crimes Act .... '); Tim
Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights
in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 390 (1974) ('The basic jurisdictional structure, then, for
Indian against Indian crimes in Indian Country gives the United States jurisdiction over those
offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, and leaves exclusive jurisdiction over all other
crimes with the tribes.').
10. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916).
11. United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 1987).
12. See generally United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
13. See generally United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993).
14. See infra notes 143-47, 154-57 and accompanying text.
15. See Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-
determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433,
472-74 (1996).
16. See generally United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994).
17. See generally United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998).
18. See generally United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994).
19. See generally Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1944). The Tenth Circuit will
not be considered separately in analysis of the circuit split, infra Part Ifl.B, because it has not
directly dealt with this issue since its ruling in 1944.
20. These circuits recognize an exception to this predominance when the defendant can
prove that federal jurisdiction contravenes a treaty between the Indian nation and the United
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cults reads the Major Crimes Act (' .C.A.") 21 in conjunction with the
General Crimes Act ("G.C.A."), 22 which immediately precedes it in the
U.S. Code and contains an exemption from federal jurisdiction for
intra-tribal crimes. These courts all reject the argument that the
G.C.A. and M.C.A. enumerate the only criminal sanctions which the
federal government can pursue against Native Americans,23 arguing
that the exemption from federal prosecution for intra-tribal crime
applies only to crime where situs is an element of the offense (so-
called "situs crimes" or "enclave laws").24 Therefore, the federal gov-
ernment can prosecute generally applicable federal criminal statutes
(which do not have a situs requirement) in cases of intra-tribal
crimes. 25 Ultimately, the difference between the two groups rests on a
question of statutory interpretation.
This jurisdiction issue is becoming more important as tribes
gain affluence (mainly through the introduction of gaming on tribal
lands) and face an increase in the number and complexity of criminal
cases that appear on tribal court dockets. 26 The little scholarship that
focuses specifically on this split suggests resolving it in favor of tribal
sovereignty, relying solely on concerns of "fairness" and history.27
However, as one commentator has argued, these considerations do not
by themselves lead to the best possible solution in such a complex
States, a nearly impossible task, as no such treaties have been signed since Congress effectively
banned them in 1871. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 66-67 (citing 16 Stat. 566 (1871)).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). This section of the Code is also referred to as the Indian
Country Crimes Act or the Enclaves Act.
23. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 840 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994); Begay, 42 F.3d at 498.
24. Situs as an element of the offense means that the federal criminal law is only applica-
ble to activities that occur in a certain location-land under exclusive federal control. Thus if
the same person performed exactly the same action at a different location, the federal govern-
ment could not prosecute. This makes the situs of the crime as much an element as the mens
rea. The statutes defining such crimes currently contain the language "applicable in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 322
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3498.
25. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 840; Yanndtt, 42 F.3d at 1004; Begay, 42 F.3d at 498.
26. See James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 147-49 (1998) (noting that the rise of Indian gaming has led to
increased tribal affluence, as well as rampant jurisdictional disputes). See generally, Nell
Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998) (presenting an overview of caselaw published by tribal courts in
1996 that illustrates the increasing complexity of the tribal justice system, in part spurred by
increasing tribal prosperity).
27. See Garnett, supra note 15, at 471-74.
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legal situation.28 While fairness and historical concerns play a part,
this Note demonstrates that the best solution is reached by applying a
dynamic statutory interpretation regime to the legal problem.29 This
Note employs analysis suggested by William Eskridge,30 studying the
problem in light of the statute's text, early decisions interpreting the
statute, and recent developments in societal attitudes toward tribal
sovereignty. By using such analysis, this Note concludes that, while
tribal sovereignty (and jurisdiction) should be the default, the federal
government has the need and power to seize some jurisdiction over
unenumerated intra-tribal crimes that are "peculiarly federal" in
nature.
Part II of this Note sets out the evolution of the problem out-
lined above, with an examination of the development of tribal jurisdic-
tion over the past two hundred years, both in Congress and in the
courts. Part III examines the two distinct lines of cases that have
emerged in the circuit courts. Part IV sets out the dynamic statutory
interpretation model that will be used to examine the problem. Part
V explains the resolution of the jurisdictional controversy, inserting
the important factors identified in Parts II and III into the model
established in Part IV.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION
Understanding the current circuit split over the reach of fed-
eral jurisdiction for intra-tribal crimes requires an examination of the
history of tribal relations with the United States, the development of
tribal legal status, and various courts' interpretation of tribal rights
and obligations over time.
28. Prof. Louis Kaplow argued this position in an address to the Law and Economics
Symposium at Vanderbilt Law School. Professor Kaplow stated that courts should examine
more than just the moral philosophists' view when making normative decisions about the law.
Louis Kaplow, Address at the Vanderbilt University Law and Economics Symposium (Nov. 4,
1998).
29. Though not without its critics, see infra note 232, this type of statutory interpretation
provides the most nuanced, sophisticated look at the problem and yields the most logical
analytical result, given the complexity of the legal issues faced here, the constant reexamination
by the courts and Congress, and the amount of time that has passed since the original bill's
enactment.
30. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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A. Historic Recognition of Tribal Sovereignty and
Criminal Jurisdiction
From colonial times, the United States and its forebears recog-
nized the sovereignty of the Indian nations.31 Recognition first came
in the form of delegations sent and received by the colonial and native
governments and, more importantly, in the signing of over 800 trea-
ties with the various Indian nations.32  The Supreme Court more
completely defined this implicit recognition of sovereignty in its deci-
sions of the early 1800s.
Worcester v. Georgia established United States law on tribal
sovereignty,3 3 clearly stating that the tribes were independent sover-
eigns, pre-dating European settlement of the Americas. 34 However,
the Court noted that the European powers had long granted their
citizens the right to own land that the natives were willing to sell.3 5
While the governments of Europe allowed dealings with the Indians
for land, they generally did not attempt to interfere with the internal
workings of the natives' governments. 36 By the 1830s, the realities of
extensive land holdings and the decimation of tribal populations led
the Court to hold in Worcester that the Cherokee Indian Nation in
Georgia was a "weak state" that had placed itself under the protection
of a more powerful one.3 7 Nevertheless, in placing itself under this
protection, the Cherokee Nation had not completely surrendered its
31. Sovereignty, as used in this Note, refers to self-governance. In the case of the tribes, it
has been limited by the "domestic dependant nations" doctrine. To the extent that sovereignty
still exists at all, it will be referred to as "tribal sovereignty." See infra notes 33-39 and accom-
panying text.
32. Under international law, treaties were a means for sovereigns to relate to one another
and to show recognition. See Kirke Kickingbird et al., Indian Sovereignty, in 6 NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 1, 6 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
33. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
34. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in his opinion for the majority:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, di-
vided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world,
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is diffi-
cult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe
could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other ... or
that the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country
discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.
Id. at 542-43.
35. See id. at 544.
36. See id. at 547.
37. Id. at 561.
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independence. 38 This form of dual sovereignty later became known as
the "domestic dependent nations" framework for describing the rela-
tionship between the Indian Nations and the United States.39 This
model retains its vitality in the courts today.
Because "domestic dependent nation" status allowed for both
tribal and federal sovereignty, the issue of law enforcement by the
United States on tribal lands arose early. The federal government, in
many of its early treaties with the tribes, mentioned the possibility of
policing various crimes in conjunction with the tribes.40  Congress
eventually discarded this cooperative approach and unilaterally ap-
plied criminal law to Indians as well as non-Indians on tribal lands in
the Act of March 3, 1817.41 The Act allowed prosecution in federal
court for any activity punishable when committed elsewhere in the
United States, whether the offender was Indian or not.42 However,
the Act contained a critical exception that recognized continuing tribal
sovereignty over internal affairs: "nothing in this act shall be so con-
strued as to . . . extend to any offence committed by one Indian
against another, within any Indian boundary. ' 43  Congress retained
this language when it revised federal Indian law in the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834. The House Indian Committee noted, 'it is
rather of courtesy than of right that we undertake to punish crimes
committed in [Indian] territory by and against our citizens. '44 The
Committee stated that Indians, in the early stages of developing
European-style governments, could not yet handle jurisdiction over
crimes against U.S. citizens, but that the assistance provided by the
federal government in no way extended to prosecution of intra-tribal
crimes .45
The first congressional attempt to uniformly regulate law
enforcement on Indian reservations was the General Crimes Act
(G.C.A.), which extended jurisdiction over general situs crimes (those
38. See id.
39. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW,
AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 4 (1994).
40. See Treaty between the Wyandot and the United States, Arts. V & IX (1785); Picker-
ing Treaty (between the Iroquois and the United States), art. VII (1794).
41. See Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, sec. 1, 3 Stat. 383 (1817).
42. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
165 (1983).
43. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, sec. 2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817).
44. DELORIA, supra note 42, at 166 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 13-14 (May 20,
1834)).
45. See id.
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crimes containing a requirement that they occur in any place under
the sole jurisdiction of the United States) to Indian country.46 Al-
though this Act was a significant step in extending federal jurisdiction
to Indians, its most important feature was continued recognition of
tribal sovereignty over intra-tribal crimes. 47 Yet pure tribal sover-
eignty did not last long, as a famous case involving a high profile
intra-tribal murder prompted Congress to enact tighter federal con-
trols over Indian criminal jurisprudence.
B. Crow Dog
The most important case affecting the development of Indian
criminal justice was also one of the most compelling stories of its day.
Early in the afternoon on August 5, 1881, a Sioux medicine man
named Crow Dog (Kan-gi-shun-ca) shot and killed a popular Sioux
chief named Spotted Tail (Sin-ta-ga-le-Scka) on a dusty road in the
Great Sioux Reservation of the Dakota Territory.48 Spotted Tail had
been a peaceful leader of the Sioux whom the federal government
supported because he acted as a buffer between it and radical tradi-
tionalist chiefs like Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse.49 His conciliatory
stance towards the U.S. government angered many of his fellow Sioux
and probably served as the impetus for his murder by Crow Dog.50
After the murder, Crow Dog's family met with Spotted Tail's family.51
As Indian tradition prescribed, they reached a compensation agree-
ment to settle the murder.5 2 Following tribal law, Crow Dog's family
agreed to pay Spotted Tail's family $600 in cash, eight horses, and one
blanket.53 As far as the tribe was concerned, the matter was settled.
When word of this traditional resolution spread (and with it
outrage among the populace surrounding the reservation that retribu-
tive justice had not been served), the federal government decided to
take action.54 Crow Dog was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder
46. Act of June 20, 1874, sec. 2145, 18 Stat. 113 (1874).
47. See id.
48. See HARRING, supra note 39, at 1.
49. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 168.
50. See id. According to reports of the day, Spotted Tail also had extended his chiefly
privileges to the wives of fellow tribesmen, adding to the animosity against him. See id.
51. See id.
52. See HARRING, supra note 39, at 1.
53. See id.
54. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 168.
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in a federal territorial court in Deadwood, South Dakota.55 The story
might have ended in a standard hanging, but Crow Dog convinced the
marshal to release him so he could put his affairs in order before
execution.56 While most people suspected that this would be the last
that white society would see of Crow Dog, he came back as promised
one snowy day and surrendered to the marshal.57 This remarkable
act of honesty and character received broad newspaper coverage, and
Crow Dog soon had attorneys volunteering to take a writ of habeas
corpus to the Supreme Court on his behalf.58 He had gone from villain
to hero, and the Court accepted his case.
In Ex parte Crow Dog the Court found that the federal gov-
ernment did not have power to prosecute intra-tribal crimes. 59  It
reached this conclusion after in-depth statutory and treaty interpreta-
tion, and held that the treaty with the Sioux signed in 1868 did not
repeal the G.C.A.'s clause exempting intra-tribal crimes from federal
prosecution.60 Accordingly, the intra-tribal crimes (or tribal sover-
eignty) exception in the G.C.A. applied to Crow Dog's case. Justice for
Spotted Tail's murder was outside federal jurisdiction and left to the
tribe. 61 The writ of habeas corpus was issued, and Crow Dog released.
C. The Major Crimes Act and Its Interpretation
Despite the popular support Crow Dog received, many people
considered the result in Crow Dog a travesty, and public outcry
prompted Congress to ensure that nothing similar would happen
again. Pressure on Congress came from two different directions.
First, "friends" of the Indians considered this result horrible because
they saw domestication as in the Indians' best interests.6 2 They be-
55. See id. at 169.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. In fact, Congress ended up paying for the costs of Crow Dog's appeal.
59. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
60. See id. at 567-68. The government had claimed that language from the first article of
the treaty (which said that "if bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong ... upon the
person or property of any one white, black, or Indian," the tribal government agreed to turn the
perpetrator over to the U.S. government) voided the exclusions of intra-tribal prosecution in the
G.C.A. Id. at 567 (quoting Treaty between the Sioux Indians and the United States, art. I, Apr.
29, 1868). The Court did not find the argument persuasive, believing the treaty referred only to
crimes by Indians of one tribe against those of another tribe. See id. at 568.
61. See id. at 572.
62. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 169.
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lieved the continued vitality of primitive tribal traditions would im-
pede the development of the tribes, ultimately to their detriment.
Public pressure also stemmed from incredulity among some in the
general populace that the federal government would release a con-
victed murderer on a "technicality" instead of hanging him.63
In response to this pressure, Congress attached a short rider to
the general appropriations act of 1889, which is now known as the
Major Crimes Act (' M.C.A."). 64 The provision took jurisdiction from
the tribes for enumerated "serious" crimes and conferred it on the
federal government.65 The original legislation enumerated only seven
offenses, but subsequent legislation and judicial interpretation have
expanded the list to fourteen felonies. 66 The Act currently reads, in
substance:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [sexual abuse], incest, as-
sault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
resulting in serious bodily injury..., an assault against an individual who has
not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under
section 661 of this title [theft] within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above of-
fenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 67
As it stands, the law applies only to crimes committed by Indi-
ans, although the victims may be of any race. The crimes must occur
within Indian country. Although the Act seemingly conflicts with the
intra-tribal exclusion still present in the G.C.A., the Court has inter-
preted the M.C.A. as controlling.6
The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the
M.C.A. in United States v. Kagama, describing the United States'
relationship with the Indian nations in more detail than it had before
and establishing a framework for U.S. sovereignty over the Indian
63. Id. at 170.
64. See id. The M.C.A. is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
65. At least one commentator has argued, based on the legislative history, that the tribes
still have concurrent jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes, albeit with no real effect, given
the limitations placed on tribal courts by the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Clinton, supra note 9,
at 559 n.295.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994).
67. Id.
68. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 129 (1988) (citing
Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1970), modified, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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nations.69 In addressing whether Congress had power to extend fed-
eral jurisdiction to the defendant, the Court looked first to the Consti-
tution but found little help in its language. 70 The Court rejected the
use of the Indian Commerce Clause, noting that finding Congressional
sovereignty over the criminal laws of the tribes would require an
extreme stretch of the power conferred by the text.71 It was, however,
able to glean from the Indian Commerce Clause that the tribes were
not like other sovereigns, and because they resided on land controlled
by two superior recognized sovereigns (the state and federal govern-
ments) they must fall under the jurisdiction of one of the two.7 2 The
Court chose the power of the federal government, primarily because it
considered the Indians' main enemies to be the states immediately
adjacent to the reservations. 73 This decision established two funda-
mental principles in Indian law: (1) the plenary power doctrine,
which essentially provides that Congress may pass any law affecting
the activities of the tribes and their relations to the federal govern-
ment (including extending federal jurisdiction over criminal matters
to tribesmen), and (2) the rule that the tribes shall deal directly with
the federal government, giving the federal courts the power to shut
out state jurisdiction.74 Thus, there is no question that Congress, by
specific action, can abrogate tribal jurisdiction over intra-tribal
crimes.7 5 The only real question, then, is whether it has done so for
crimes not enumerated in the M.C.A.
The Supreme Court has said that some non-enumerated of-
fenses, specifically lesser included offenses of the enumerated crimes,
fall within the jurisdiction of federal district courts in certain circum-
stances. Keeble v. United States involved Francis Keeble, an Indian
convicted of assault with intent to commit serious bodily harm.76 At
trial, he asked the judge to instruct the jury that it could convict him
of the lesser included offense of simple assault, but the judge refused
69. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court addressed the issue of
whether the federal government had the power to prosecute Kagama, who had been indicted for
killing another Indian on the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California. See id. at 376.
70. See id. at 378.
71. See id. at 378-79.
72. See id. at 379.
73. See id. at 384.
74. See HARRING, supra note 39, at 146, 150.
75. Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have stated that Congress must be clear
when it exercises this plenary power to take away tribal sovereignty. See Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
76. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 206 (1973).
1999] 1489
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
because the M.C.A. did not specifically mention simple assault, mak-
ing that offense a "matter for the tribe."77 The Supreme Court ruled
that, because defendants are generally entitled to instruction on
lesser included offenses to avoid inappropriate conviction of a more
serious offense, the district court could not deny the Indian defendant
that right simply because he was an Indian.78 The Supreme Court
could "hardly conclude that Congress intended to disqualify Indians
from the benefits of a lesser offense instruction, when those benefits
are made available to any non-Indian charged with the same of-
fense. '79 The Court cautiously noted that its ruling did not in any way
infringe on the residual jurisdiction of the tribe, but that it could only
be used when raised as a defense to charges, the prosecution of which
was authorized by statute (i.e. the M.C.A.). 80 The dissent highlighted
the logical problems with this semantic construct and noted that the
M.C.A. "vested a residual jurisdiction in [tribal courts] over all other
offenses" not covered by the Act."' The dissent argued that because
the federal government is one of enumerated powers and because
residual jurisdiction here rested with the tribes, federal courts do not
have the power to convict on lesser included-but unenumerated-
crimes, regardless of the benefit to the criminal defendant, because
they have no jurisdiction over those offenses . 2
D. Recent Legislative History
Congress has had several opportunities to reexamine the
meaning of the M.C.A. in amendments to the Act. The ambiguous
nature of the these reexaminations is one of the major reasons for the
current circuit split. Since the views of Congress and the nation
change significantly over long periods of time, this Note will only
consider modifications of the last thirty years.83 Starting in 1968,
some House members attempted to amend the M.C.A. to permit fed-
77. Id. at 206.
78. See id. at 211-12.
79. Id. at 212.
80. See id. at 214.
81. Id. at 217 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 216-17.
83. As Eskridge stated, "Cultural shifts generate movement of statutory meaning.
Changes in society, its values, and its competing ideologies shape and reshape statutory mean-
ing as they reveal new practical problems unresolved by the statute . . .and novel political
environments attentive to interpretive developments." ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 81.
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eral jurisdiction over intra-tribal aggravated assaults.8 4 Although this
effort initially failed, statements of the amendment's sponsor clearly
indicate a belief that, without specifically enumerated jurisdiction,
punishment is left to the tribal courts. 85
This clarity of thought evaporated just eight years later, when
Congress amended the M.C.A. to adjust for a constitutional defect
that a number of circuit court decisions had illuminated. 6 The House
Committee Report considered in detail the status of jurisdiction over
crimes committed on tribal lands.8 7  The report noted that for intra-
tribal crimes, the federal government had jurisdiction over the thir-
teen enumerated offenses of the M.C.A. and that "[j]urisdiction over
other offenses rest[ed] with the tribe.188 However, the report cited two
"overriding exceptions" to the rule: the first for situations where the
federal government had ceded to certain states' jurisdiction over the
tribes within their borders, 9 and a second for "peculiarly Federal
[crimes] ...such as assaulting a Federal officer or defrauding the
United States."90  Even with this exception for peculiarly federal
84. This proposed change was originally to be included in the Indian Civil Rights Act, but
was eventually enacted as a free-standing bill. See S. REP. NO. 90-721 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1854-67.
85. 'Vithout this amendment an Indian can commit a serious crime and receive only a
maximum sentence of 6 months. Since Indian courts cannot impose more than a 6-month
sentence, the crime of aggravated assault should be prosecuted in a Federal court ...." Id. at
1866.
86. The unconstitutional provision concerned different treatment of Indian and non-
Indian rape defendants. Since the Indian could be tried in federal court using state law stan-
dards, and the non-Indian using federal law standards, a disparity in sentencing for the same
offense could arise. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, at 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1125, 1127-28.
87. See id. at 2-3.
88. Id. at 3. In support of this point, the committee noted that a section-by-section
analysis of the bill indicated that, since kidnapping was not enumerated, intra-tribal kidnap-
pings would be "subject to prosecution only in a tribal court." Id. at 5. Consequently, Congress
added kidnapping to the list of enumerated offenses. See id.
89. This essentially acknowledges Public Law 280, discussed infra Part H.F.
90. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127 (citation
omitted). The origin and use of this language deserves some attention. From the cites listed in
the Committee report, it appears that Congress found this exception based on a law review
article by Tim Vollmann. See supra note 9. In that article, Vollmann noted that the basic
structure for criminal jurisdiction was that the federal government had jurisdiction only over
crimes listed in the M.C.A., and the tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over all other crimes. He
then acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit may have carved out an exception for any generally
applicable "federal" crime, such as assaulting a federal officer. However, Vollmann dismissed
this possibility as unworkable. See Vollmann, supra note 9, at 390-91. The committee never-
theless picked up on this language and included it in its report. This is particularly ironic
because Vollmann's reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision was incorrect according to the
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crimes, the committee remained concerned about the possibility that
some defendants accused of intra-tribal crimes could go free.91 How-
ever, the report offers no definitive indication of whether Congress
believed that the intra-tribal exception was limited to situs crimes.
92
Congress has not yet carefully considered whether the excep-
tion to intra-tribal crimes applies only to situs crimes or in general.
Articulating its reasons for amending the M.C.A. to include maiming
and involuntary sodomy, 93 the committee noted that outside of intra-
tribal situations, Congress regulated maiming as a situs crime, so it
should be included in the list of enumerated offenses. 94 However, the
committee conspicuously left out any situs references when discussing
forcible sodomy. Rather, it stated that sodomy is a serious sexual
offense that the M.C.A. should cover, as it was then "impossible" to
prosecute outside of the tribal courts. 95 From this language, one can-
not tell whether Congress regarded only intra-tribal situs crimes as
exempted by implication, but the committee clearly found at least one
unenumerated intra-tribal crime, forcible sodomy, beyond the juris-
diction of the federal courts.
In 1986, another proposed change to the M.C.A. yielded several
notable pieces of legislative history, specifically in the committee
report on the proposed inclusion of the sexual molestation of a minor
in Indian country.96 The committee expressed views on jurisdiction
similar to those contained in the 1976 report.9 7 It again apparently
Circuit's later interpretations. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text. However, this
language became self-perpetuating, as the Seventh Circuit relied on it in Smith. See infra note
157.
91. See supra note 88.
92. See supra note 24 for an explanation of situs crimes.
93. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 322-23 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3498-
99.
94. "There seems no reason why this offense, presently applicable within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is not included within the Major
Crimes Act, the purpose of which is to extend Federal jurisdiction over all serious offenses...
that are committed by an Indian in Indian country." Id.
95. "[Forcible sodomy's] absence represents a serious gap in felony coverage making it
impossible to prosecute and punish (except by a tribal court at a petty offense level) this offense
when committed against an Indian victim by an Indian in Indian country." Id. at 323.
96. See H.R. REP. No. 99-528 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1298.
97. In particular, it adopts the same approach of designating jurisdiction over various
offenses based on the race of the perpetrator and the victim and the location of the crime. See
supra note 88. In describing intra-tribal crimes, it diverges from the earlier formula in one
significant way: omitting the line that stated that jurisdiction over all other crimes rests with
the tribes. However, the report makes an even stronger statement along these same lines in its
discussion of problems with the current law. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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considered exclusive tribal jurisdiction the rule subject to federal
jurisdiction for "peculiarly federal" crimes, such as assaulting a fed-
eral officer. 98 Also, according to the report, tribe members themselves
called for federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal child molestation. 99
Tribal support for incorporation casts doubt on the popular notion
that Indians generally regard more tribal jurisdiction as a desirable
end. Much of the tribe members' hesitation toward retaining exclu-
sive tribal jurisdiction over serious, non-enumerated crimes stems
from the nature of the tribal court system as it currently stands.100
E. Tribal Court Systems
Historically, Indian tribes have recognized three ways to solve
legal problems: (1) traditional courts, (2) Courts of Indian Offenses,
and (3) Tribal Courts. 10 Traditional courts functioned in the tradi-
tional Indian ways, with little concern for retributive punishment and
great focus on restitution.0 2  They were often steeped in religious
ceremony and frequently very secretive. After years of assimilation
efforts by the federal government, most of these traditional tribal
structures no longer function.
98. The Committee describes an exception for "peculiarly Federal" crimes, again relying
on an interpretation of case law. The Committee relied on a reading of Walks on Top v. United
States, 372 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1967), which, as discussed earlier, does not comport with the
Ninth Circuit's reading of that decision. See supra note 90. In describing the problems with the
current law, it uses very strong language supporting the idea of exclusive tribal jurisdiction for
non-enumerated offenses. "Under current law, the Federal government can prosecute an Indian
for committing, in Indian country, a serious offense against another Indian, only if the offense is
listed in the Major Crimes Act. If the offense is not listed, only the tribe has jurisdiction to
punish the offense...." H.R. REP. No. 99-528, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1298,
1301.
99. See id. at 5-8. The committee heard from a number of Indian witnesses, including
representatives of the National Congress of American Indians, the Navajo Nation, the American
Indian Law Center, and the Association on American Indian Affairs. See id. at 5 n.18. While
some of these did express reservations about certain provisions of the bill, most called for
incorporation of child molestation into the M.C.A. so that the federal government could prose-
cute these offenses. The testimony by Nancy Tuthill, the Director of the American Indian Law
Center, was typical. She was concerned about effects on tribal sovereignty but nevertheless
pushed for the amendment. "Mhe inability of tribes to effectively combat the problem of child
sexual abuse has reached crisis proportions and my primary concern is for an immediate vehicle
for prosecution of child sexual offenders," she said. Id. at 8.
100. Knowledge of the current tribal court system serves two purposes for this Note: (1) it
helps explain why some Indians might not favor more jurisdiction, and (2) it enables a realistic
discussion of the alternatives to the federal court system.
101. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 554-55.
102. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 111-12.
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The Courts of Indian Offenses were offspring of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ("B.I.A.") and only fleetingly recognized by the federal
government. 1 3 Though they dealt with criminal offenses, they han-
dled criminal justice in an administrative way, without structural
guidelines, which meant they could handle as many or as few issues
as they desired.10 4 These quasi-legal institutions may have contrib-
uted to the current confusion over the extent of federal jurisdiction
because they handled all tribal justice the federal government thought
necessary outside of the M.C.A. but did so without real authority.
While they affected the historical development of the current problem,
the Courts of Indian Offenses have essentially been relegated to his-
tory's dustbin, phased out by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.105
Modern Tribal Courts started with the same legislation that
ended the old Courts of Indian Offenses. Unlike traditional courts,
which focused on restitution and religion, these reflect the influence of
the U.S. court system.10 6 Nevertheless, they hold on to Indian cul-
tural values and remain reluctant to incorporate legal precedent from
European-style systems. 10 7  These courts govern most civil disputes
between tribe members and criminal matters not preempted by fed-
eral legislation like the M.C.A.10 8 However, these courts are not com-
pletely effective, according to the National American Indian Court
Judges Association, due to political pressure from tribal and religious
leaders, lack of judicial training for judges, lack of support staff, in-
ability to enforce court orders, too close a relationship with tribal law
enforcement, and interference from the B.I.A.10 9
103. See HARRING, supra note 39, at 186-88.
104. See id.
105. Under this act, the tribes could take over the function of the courts if they elected to
do so, and the vast majority have. A few Courts of Indian Offenses still function, but their
numbers and significance are negligible. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 115-16.
106. See id. at 116.
107. See id. at 120.
108. See id. at 116.
109. See National American Indian Court Judges Association, The Indian Judiciary and
the Concept of Separation of Powers, in 2 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 30-37 (1974). At
least one commentator has argued that the development of viable tribal courts is not worth the
costs. As such, the system should be scrapped and intra-tribal disputes handled by a court
system integrated with regular county and state courts. He claims that there is no historical
evidence justifying the fear that such integration would hasten the demise of Indian culture.
See Samuel J. Brakel, American Indian Tribal Courts, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147,
162 (Lawrence French ed., 1982).
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F. The Indian Civil Rights Act and Public Law 280
Two related laws that must be mentioned to complete the
picture of jurisdiction over tribal crimes are the Indian Civil Rights
Act ("I.C.R.A.") and Public Law 280. Congress passed the Indian Civil
Rights Act" 0 in 1968 to combat perceived defects in the tribal court
system by codifying most of the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights,
which does not directly apply to the tribes."' In addition to extending
those rights, the law set restrictions in the sentences tribal courts can
hand down, limiting the maximum sentence such a court can impose
to one year in tribal jails and a $5,000 fine. 12 Obviously, this severe
restriction must be considered when deciding whether tribal courts
should handle serious, unenumerated crimes.
Public Law 280113 removed some tribes from federal jurisdic-
tion and placed them under exclusive control of the state. It handed
five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin)
civil and criminal jurisdiction over most Indian lands within their
state borders.1' 4 It also gave other states the ability to voluntarily
assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands.1 5 Those states,
however, exercise only concurrent jurisdiction with the tribes and
must comply with tribal extradition treaties where they exist." 6
Thus, jurisdictional issues for unenumerated crimes do not arise
where a state, and not the federal government, has plenary power
over the tribes.
G. Summary
The United States has a long history of recognizing the sover-
eignty of Indian tribes. However, the courts have acknowledged the
"domestic dependent nation" status of the tribes and thus Congress's
plenary power over tribal governments. The federal government
110. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (1968) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1321-26, 1331, 1341 (1994)).
111. See DELORIA, supra note 42, at 175.
112. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1994).
114. See id.
115. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 94-95 (Nicholas J. Spaeth ed., 1993).
116. See id. at 97. In some instances, the states may have jurisdiction over some or all
crimes on Indian reservations.
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inarguably has responsibility for prosecution of certain major offenses
that occur on Indian land between Indians, possibly has authority
over "peculiarly federal" offenses, and also has circumstantially lim-
ited jurisdiction over lesser included offenses. Tribal courts, absent
some state interference, maintain sovereignty over minor offenses on
tribal lands. The only question remaining is who can prosecute gen-
erally applicable federal offenses not specifically enumerated by the
M.C.A. that are committed by one Indian against another on tribal
lands. The circuits have addressed this question of statutory inter-
pretation with varying results.
III. THE SPLIT AMONG CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Pro-Tribal Jurisdiction Circuits
The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits fall into the broad
category of pro-tribal jurisdiction circuits. Among these, the Fourth
Circuit is the most pro-tribal, denying federal jurisdiction for any
unenumerated crime. The Second and Seventh Circuits allow federal
jurisdiction over non-enumerated crimes but only if they are "pecu-
liarly federal."117 This section discusses the most prominent recent
decision on the subject from each circuit, starting with the Fourth
Circuit's particularly pro-tribal sovereignty holding in United States v.
Welch. 118
The Welch court took the position that any non-enumerated
crime fell outside the jurisdiction of the federal government, and
prosecution and punishment for such crimes were left to the tribe.
Welch appealed a district court conviction of child molestation under
North Carolina law,"19 arguing that he faced prosecution only under
the M.C.A. (applying federal criminal standards) because the crimes
were allegedly committed by one Indian against another on tribal
lands.120 In addressing this claim, the court considered the relation-
ship between the various federal statutes govermng jurisdiction over
117. Whether the Seventh Circuit still follows this model is now an open question. See
infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
118. United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1987).
119. See id. at 461.
120. See id. at 461-62.
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intra-tribal crimes, specifically focusing its inquiry on the breadth of
the M.C.A.
The court held that the Act only extended federal jurisdiction
over Indians to specifically listed offenses, with unenumerated of-
fenses left to the tribes. 121 The court first examined the Supreme
Court's history of American Indian jurisprudence, using Keeble as a
guide and quoting it at length regarding exclusive tribal jurisdiction
as recognized by Crow Dog and the subsequent enactment of the
M.C.A.122 The court concluded that "[w]hen there is a crime by an
Indian against another Indian within Indian country only those of-
fenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act may be tried in the fed-
eral courts.' 1 23  The Indian tribes still possess all sovereignty not
taken away by a treaty or law passed by Congress, including the
power to punish intra-tribal offenses under tribal law.
124
Given this finding, the court set the conviction aside because
the crime, first degree sexual offense, was not enumerated in the
M.C.A.,125 which meant that federal courts lacked power to try and
punish the defendant. The court did this in spite of the defendant's
uncontested guilt and the particularly horrible nature of the crime
charged.126
The Second Circuit took a more modest approach to the juris-
diction question, finding federal jurisdiction over non-enumerated
crimes as long as they involve a "peculiarly Federal" interest. It laid
out this framework in United States v. Markiewicz, a case resulting
from a dispute over tribal governance and distribution of funds raised
at the tribe's bingo hall.127
The New York branch of the Oneida tribe operated a bingo hall
from 1985 until it was forced to close in 1987 after an intra-tribal
disagreement. 128 The bingo hall was the major center of activity in
the Oneida Territory and run by a three-person business commit-
tee. 129 The scope of the committee's authority and its administration
121. See id. at 465.
122. See id. at 463-64 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1973)).
123. Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 464-65 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 326-27 (1978)).
125. See id. at 465.
126. See id. The defendant had been convicted of raping a three year-old and infecting her
with chlamydia. See id. at 462.
127. United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1992).
128. See id. at 793-94.
129. See id. at 794.
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of the bingo hall became a major source of contention among tribe
members. 130 Hostilities escalated until a group of the committee's
dissenters forced the bingo hall to close in late 1987, illegally distrib-
uted tribe revenues, and finally burned down the hall in February,
1988.131 Participating dissenters were arrested, and this appeal fol-
lowed convictions for violating the anti-riot act, maliciously damaging
a building used in interstate commerce by means of fire, and theft of
tribal funds.132
The central issue on appeal was whether the federal district
court had jurisdiction, because the crimes arose from an internal
tribal dispute, which the defendants claimed exempted them from
general federal criminal jurisdiction. The district court rejected this
argument, holding that "federal criminal laws of general applicability
apply even where a native American is both the defendant and the
victim and the acts complained of occurred on a reservation.'' 33 While
the appellate court ultimately upheld jurisdiction, it differed in its
reasoning. It held that the federal courts did not have unlimited
jurisdiction but only power over "peculiarly federal" crimes, and that,
ultimately, jurisdiction was not really at issue because the case in-
volved no non-enumerated crimes within tribal control. 3 4
In coming to its conclusion, the court examined the role of
enclave (situs) laws, 135 noting that these cover lands under federal
control. This presented a problem in the case of tribal lands, since the
United States historically recognized some level of tribal sover-
eignty.136  The court explained that Congress had addressed this
problem by passing two laws. The first (the G.C.A.) applied federal
enclave laws to tribal lands, but included the exception that the laws
130. See id.
131. See id. at 794-95. To prevent further disruption, the original tribal business manager
filed a civil suit against two of the dissenters in federal district court and obtained a preliminary
injunction in early 1988. See id. at 794. The suit only aggravated the dissenters, prompting
them to declare the dormant tribal council revived for the purpose of distributing bingo hall
money. See id. at 794-95. Eventually, the dissenters expressed their anger by burning down
the bingo hall. See id. at 795.
132. See id. at 795-96.
133. Id. at 797 (quoting United States v. Markiewicz, No. 89-CR-88, 1989 WL 139221, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. 1989)).
134. See id. at 800.
135. See id. at 797.
136. See id.
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did not extend to intra-tribal crimes. 137 The second (the M.C.A.) spe-
cifically extended federal jurisdiction to some previously unprosecu-
table crimes.
The Second Circuit, in interpreting the reach of these two
statutes, relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
Quiver,138 in which the defendant faced an adultery charge-a crime
not listed in the M.C.A. There, the Supreme Court ruled that "enu-
meration... of certain offenses as applicable to Indians in the reser-
vations carries with it some implication of a purpose to exclude oth-
ers."'139 The Second Circuit accordingly articulated the jurisdiction
rule: "the relations of the Indians, among themselves-the conduct of
one toward another-is to be controlled by the customs and laws of
the tribe, save when Congress expressly or clearly directs other-
wise." 40
The Second Circuit wrote that the district court, like the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, ignored Quiver when it ruled that any
federal criminal law of general applicability was in force on tribal
lands, a position the Second Circuit declined to take.' 4' Instead, the
court followed the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Smith,142 applying a model focused on "peculiarly Federal" offenses. 43
This approach allows exclusive tribal jurisdiction over non-
enumerated crimes with two exceptions: (1) where federal laws have
ceded to certain states partial jurisdiction, such as under PL 280; and
(2) when the crimes are "peculiarly Federal" in nature, such as as-
sault on a federal officer or defrauding the U.S. government. 44 In
addition to the Seventh Circuit precedent, the court relied on the
137. This is the current version of the General Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1994).
Section 1153 is the current form of the M.C.A. See supra notes 46-47, 64-67 and accompanying
text.
138. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
139. Id.
140. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798 (quoting Quiver, 241 U.S. at 605-06). Quiver is not
dispositive on the issue this Note discusses for at least three reasons. First, the M.C.A. has
been reauthorized numerous times since the decision. Second, the circuits have handed down a
number of decisions challenging this language, which the Supreme Court has not overturned.
Finally, since the contested adultery in Quiver was a situs crime, the Court's language might
only be applicable in situs situations, leaving the question open as to laws of general applicabil-
ity.
141. See id.
142. United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977).
143. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800.
144. See id. at 799.
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legislative history of the Indian Crimes Act passed in 1976,149 and
dicta in the Supreme Court's United States v. Wheeler.146 The court
observed that the "peculiarly Federal" crimes exception struck a good
balance between Quiver's recognition of exclusive tribal jurisdiction
over intra-tribal crimes and the need to protect acute federal interests
when they arise. 147
Remarkably, this long discussion on the extent of federal juris-
diction did not ultimately play a role in the outcome of the case. The
court, after explaining the doctrine, found no issue of tribal sover-
eignty because the crimes either were not intra-tribal, did not occur
on tribal lands, or were enumerated in the Act and thus fell under
federal jurisdiction. 148 The entire discussion, while clearly stating the
position of the Second Circuit on this issue, was dicta unnecessary to
the review of the district court's decision.
As the Second Circuit noted, the Seventh Circuit also follows
the "peculiarly Federal" model, 149 but its precedent is a bit more con-
fusing. United States v. Smith150 dealt with an assault by one Indian
on another who happened to be a Special Officer of the B.I.A.151 The
district court, although finding a technical assault, decided that the
offense did not warrant a federal court trial and fined the defendant
ten dollars. 152 The defendant appealed on the basis of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because simple assault does not appear in the
M.C.A.'s list of offenses. 153
The appellate court approached the question of tribal sover-
eignty carefully, concluding that the federal court had jurisdiction-
albeit concurrent with the tribes--over this particular fact pattern
145. See id. The court cited part of the House Report on the bill as support for its conclu-
sion. See id. The report specifically stated that jurisdiction over the crimes not enumerated by
the M.C.A. rests with the tribes-with two exceptions, the reach of Public Law 280 and the
"overriding exception . . . for crimes that are peculiarly Federal." H.R. REP. No. 94-1038,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127. See also supra Part ll.D.
146. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The Second Circuit believed the
Supreme Court implicitly adopted this reasoning in two footnotes to Wheeler, id. at 330 n.30,
331 n.32, in which it stated that federal jurisdiction existed when an Indian assaulted a federal
officer, because there is an "independent federal interest to be protected." Markiewicz, 978 F.2d
at 800.
147. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977).
151. See id. at 455. The defendant, a member of the Menominee tribe, pushed the officer
(also Menominee) when the officer attempted to serve a summons on him. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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beit concurrent with the tribes--over this particular fact pattern
because the crime was "peculiarly Federal" in nature. 54 The court
carefully avoided determining whether any otherwise generally appli-
cable federal criminal statute governs the tribes. The court looked at
the Supreme Court's decision in Quiver and its more recent interpre-
tations of tribal authority in Keeble and United States v. Antelope.155
It noted that although the Supreme Court recognized that the M.C.A.
is a "carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes," exclusive tribal jurisdiction
over unenumerated criminal matters remains unresolved because the
issue has not directly confronted the Court.156 The Smith court found
concurrent jurisdiction in this case because assaulting a B.I.A. officer,
a "peculiarly Federal" offense, involved acts of paramount importance
to the federal government. It reached this conclusion by observing
that no case law prohibited concurrent jurisdiction and examining the
legislative history of the Indian Crimes Act of 1976, which explicitly
referred to federal jurisdiction over "peculiarly Federal" crimes, such
as "assaulting a Federal Officer."'157
After the Smith decision, the Seventh Circuit obscured its rule
with United States v. Funmaker.5 8 In that case, the defendant had
set fire to the tribe's bingo hall and casino at the direction of tribe
leaders, doing so because of an intra-tribal dispute over bingo hall
management and revenues. 159 He pled guilty to attempting to destroy
by fire a building involved in interstate commerce but reserved his
right to appeal on the question of federal jurisdiction. 160
This time, the Seventh Circuit discussed the history and devel-
opment of the tribal sovereignty doctrine.' 61 Although it quoted Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,162 it noted that tribal
sovereignty, limited in many ways, exists only in the absence of fed-
eral law to the contrary. 163 The court then considered whether stat-
154. See id. at 458.
155. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
156. Smith, 562 F.2d at 457.
157. Id. at 456, 458 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 (1976) at 3, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127). See also supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993).
159. See id. at 1329.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1330.
162. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
163. See Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1330.
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utes that fail to address tribes specifically apply to tribe members. It
found that
[a]s a general rule, statutes written in terms applying to all persons include
members of Indian tribes as well. An exception, however, follows on the heels
of the rule, namely that when the application of a statute would affect ...
rights essential to self-governance of intramural matters, the law specifically
must evince Congressional intent to interfere with those rights.
164
Under this framework, the court considered whether the fed-
eral government had jurisdiction over Funmaker's crimes. The court's
inquiry focused on whether laws criminalizing arson of a building
involved in interstate commerce and using a destructive device in a
crime of violence applied to the tribes. 165 Neither law specifically
mentions Indian tribes, but the Funmaker court found them applica-
ble based on the power vested in Congress by the Interstate Com-
merce Clause. 166 The court reasoned that since these laws applied to
crimes that involved interstate commerce, they naturally extended
beyond purely intra-tribal matters. 167 As such, the federal govern-
ment has a unique interest in protecting the goods involved, especially
where the tribe has no incentive to analyze how its actions affect
others. 168
This Seventh Circuit decision dilutes the peculiarly federal
interest model by expanding its scope to include almost all generally
applicable federal criminal law. Although one commentator has ar-
gued that tribal sovereignty proponents can use this case to support
limiting federal jurisdiction to only those instances involving a "pecu-
liarly Federal" interest, 169 the case did not explicitly recognize that
narrow doctrine. Instead, it relied on the fact that the federal gov-
ernment had a unique interest in protecting interstate commerce 170-
a far cry from the Second Circuit's doctrine, which finds the federal
interest only in cases like assault on a federal officer.' 71 That the
court cited Ollie's Barbecue (Katzenbach v. McClung) suggests that it
164. Id. at 1330-31 (citations omitted).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1331.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Garnett, supra note 15, at 470-71.
170. See Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1331.
171. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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crafted an extremely expansive doctrine.17 2 Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine what generally applicable federal criminal law escapes the
net of "unique federal interest" proposed by this case. If the result of
Funmaker represents the current position of the Seventh Circuit, it
has severely weakened the "peculiarly Federal" interest doctrine in
that circuit.
B. Pro-Federal Jurisdiction Circuits
Three circuits, 173 the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth, have ruled that
the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute any generally
applicable federal criminal statute regardless of whether the crime
occurred between Indians on tribal land.174 These circuits reject the
argument that the list of crimes in the M.C.A. is exhaustive, believing
instead that the prohibition drawn by the G.C.A. and early Supreme
Court decisions applies only to situs crimes, i.e., crimes which must
occur on federal lands. To understand the circuits' reasoning, this
Note examines the most recent major decisions on the subject from
each, starting with the Eighth Circuit's United States v. Wadena."'
5
Wadena involved an appeal by tribal council members con-
victed of a number of crimes relating to the construction of a casino on
tribal lands. All of the defendants were found guilty of accepting
kickbacks, stealing tribal funds, and tribal election conspiracy. 76 The
defendants challenged the federal court's jurisdiction to prosecute
them for the various offenses, claiming that the M.C.A. and the
G.C.A. represent the only federal law applicable to this type of case,
and that neither of those conferred federal jurisdiction for the crime of
which the defendants were accused.'
172. See Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1331 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
173. As noted supra, the Tenth Circuit has also ruled on this issue but only once, in 1944.
As such, independent discussion of its conclusions adds no insights to this Note. See supra note
19.
174. These circuits recognize a narrow exception. The federal courts will step aside where
the tribes have a treaty with the federal government giving them exclusive jurisdiction over
intra-tribal crimes, an extremely rare situation and very difficult for defendants to prove. See
supra note 20.
175. United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998).
176. See id. at 837-39.
177. See id. at 839.
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The court rejected this argument, finding it too restrictive of
government power. The court looked first at the G.C.A. 17 8 and dis-
cussed its history through the Crow Dog decision and congressional
passage of the M.C.A.179 The defendant claimed that the language in
the G.C.A. excepting intra-tribal crimes from federal prosecution was
a general exemption, overcome only for those crimes specifically enu-
merated in the M.C.A., as the Supreme Court seemed to rule in
Quiver.180 The court declined to read the statute in this way, citing its
own precedent 8' while acknowledging that its decision conflicted with
those of other circuits .1 2
The court gave five separate reasons before it arrived at this
conclusion. First, it noted that a number of appellate courts agreed
with its reading that, because the limited intra-tribal exception con-
tained in the G.C.A. applied only to situs crimes, the federal courts
may enforce any generally applicable federal criminal laws on the
Indians. 183 Next, it found the ambiguous rule allowing prosecution for
"peculiarly federal" crimes difficult to apply, as any time Congress
passes a law it must have a federal interest in order for its actions to
pass constitutional muster.84 Identifying a federal interest in a gen-
eral federal criminal law seemed "redundant."'185 Third, the court
found that, although it may have been assumed at the time of the
G.C.A.'s passage that only federal enclave laws applied to Indians,
that presumption has since been discarded. 8 6 Fourth, the court
looked to the actual language of the M.C.A., claiming that the excep-
tion only applied to situs crimes and no others, affording Indian
criminals no protection from general federal law.8 7 In support of this,
it observed that the adultery law conviction overturned in Quiver was
178. The court here referred to the G.C.A. as the Indian Country Crimes Act. See id. at
840.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 840-41 (citing United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 384-86 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 454-55 (8th Cir. 1974); Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d
561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974)).
182. See id. at 841.
183. See id. (citing decisions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the writings of
Felix Cohen and the Supreme Court's Wheeler decision).
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 841-42 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S.
99, 116-17 (1960)).
187. See id. at 842.
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a situs crime.18 8 Finally, the Wadena court found that, although the
federal government has traditionally expressed broad respect for the
tribes on internal matters, the court did not regard tribal interests as
paramount to the federal interests implicated by the crimes charged
against the defendants. 189 Based on these five reasons, the court
found federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal offenses for generally ap-
plicable federal crimes.
The Ninth Circuit similarly supported federal jurisdiction in
its most recent ruling on the issue, United States v. Begay,190 which
involved conspiracy to commit assault and kidnapping. The convic-
tion related to an uprising on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona that
resulted from an intra-tribal rivalry over administration of the tribal
council.191
The appellants argued that because the M.C.A. does not spe-
cifically mention conspiracy, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the charges. 192 The court rejected this claim, holding that the
district court had jurisdiction over the conspiracy charges. 193 The
court stated that Congress passed two acts, the G.C.A. and the
M.C.A., infringing on tribal sovereignty. 94 Like the Eighth Circuit,
the Begay court found that the M.C.A. only dealt with the application
of federal enclave law (situs laws) to Indians and had no bearing on
federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal
wherever committed. 195 As such, the exclusions from jurisdiction
explicit in the G.C.A. (not permitting prosecution for intra-tribal
crimes) and implied in the M.C.A. (not permitting prosecution for at
least some non-enumerated offenses) have no application to federal
criminal laws that do not contain situs as an element of the offense.
188. Id. at 842 n.18 (citing "Certain Offenses in the Territories," ch. 13, § 316, 7 Fed. Stat.
968 (1916)). The crime had to be committed at "any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States." Id.
189. See id. at 842. The court believed "[Iflederal jurisdiction over the offenses committed
here is imperative for the protection of all Native Americans who are U.S. citizens living on
Indian reservations." Id.
190. United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994).
191. See id. at 489-97.
192. See id. at 497-98.
193. See id. at 500.
194. See id. at 498.
195. See id. at 498-99.
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According to the court, Indians stand exempt from generally applica-
ble federal crimes only if exempted by treaty. 196
The court also rejected defendants' arguments based on the
"peculiarly Federal" model used by the Second Circuit, stating that it
did not believe that the precedent cited in Markiewicz 97 supported the
conclusion drawn by that court. 198 The Begay court found that the
district court had jurisdiction, as Ninth Circuit precedent clearly
allowed it for non-enumerated offenses. 99
Although the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have developed the
most precedent dealing with this issue, an examination of their case
law origins reveals no greater claim to validity than those of the pro-
tribal circuits. The Eighth Circuit's initial ruling on the issue con-
cluded that the exemption for intra-tribal crimes "does not encompass
the laws of the United States that make actions criminal wherever
committed."200 It based its ruling on Head v. Hunter,20' a 1944 Tenth
Circuit case that held generally applicable criminal laws governed
Indians because neither Congress nor any court had stated other-
wise.202  This logic ignored the underlying tenet that only specific
196. See id. at 499 (citing United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975)). As
discussed earlier, the possibility of a defendant successfully making such a claim is extremely
remote. See supra note 20.
197. In that case, the Second Circuit acknowledged that its opinion differed from the
Ninth's. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 799 (2d Cir. 1992).
198. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 500 & n.20. Specifically, the court disagreed with the Second
Circuit's reading of footnotes 30 and 32 of Wheeler as recognizing jurisdiction only over crimes
which involved a peculiar federal interest. See supra note 146. The pertinent language read:
"Federal jurisdiction also extends to crimes ... over which there is federal jurisdiction regard-
less of whether an Indian is involved, such as assaulting a federal officer." United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330 n.30 (1978) (citations omitted). This language could plausibly be
read either to extend jurisdiction of all generally applicable federal crimes, or just to extend it
for those peculiarly federal in nature, as suggested by Congress two years prior to the Wheeler
court's decision. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Given these two plausible readings,
the Ninth Circuit did not see how the Second Circuit had conclusively extracted from these
footnotes that general laws required a showing of a "peculiarly federal" interest to bring intra-
tribal crimes within the federal government's jurisdiction. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 500.
199. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 500. The court stated that the law of the Ninth Circuit "clearly
allows Indians to be charged under federal criminal statutes of nationwide applicability if the
charge is not otherwise affected by federal enclave law, or if Indians have not been particularly
excluded, either expressly or impliedly, from the statute's application." Id.
200. Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974).
201. Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1944). As noted supra, the Tenth Circuit has
not directly addressed the issue since this ruling and is therefore not considered separately in
the analysis. See supra note 19.
202. There is nothing in the legislation to indicate, or from which it can be
inferred that the jurisdiction of the United States was restricted in respect to
crimes which are generally applicable throughout the United States to all
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Congressional action removes tribal sovereignty. 2 3  The Ninth Cir-
cuit's line has similarly assailable logical origins in Walks on Top v.
United States.204 There, the court simply concluded, with little ex-
planation and no citation of authority, that the intra-tribal crimes
exemption in the G.C.A. only applies to federal enclave law and not to
generally applicable federal criminal statutes.20 5
The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on precedent from the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits in determining that the federal government has
jurisdiction over non-enumerated crimes. It faced the issue directly in
United States v. Yannott,206 a case involving an Indian defendant who
became intoxicated at a party on tribal lands and pulled a sawed-off
shotgun on an Indian woman attending the party.20 7 Another atten-
dee took the gun from the defendant and delivered it to tribal police,
who arrested the defendant for possession of a firearm almost three
weeks later.208 Tribal police eventually turned the gun over to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which arrested, tried, and
convicted the defendant in federal court.20 9  On appeal, he claimed
that the district court lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: first, he had
already been punished by the tribal courts as required by the G.C.A.'s
grant of intra-tribal jurisdiction, and, second, the offenses were not
enumerated in the M.C.A.210
The Sixth Circuit dismissed both arguments. First, the court,
relying on interpretations by the Eighth Circuit, found that the intra-
tribal exclusions under the G.C.A. apply only to situs crimes,211 which
persons. We are cited no Act, and find none, indicating an intention to ex-
cept [Indians] ....
Head, 141 F.2d at 451.
203. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
204. Walks on Top v. United States, 372 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1967).
205. Id. at 425. The totality of the court's discussion of the issue was as follows: 'This
argument completely lacks merit as the exception granted to Indians who abuse other Indians
is, by the terms of the statute, only an exception from federal enclave law and not from the
general law of the United States.. ." Id.
206. United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994).
207. See id. at 1001.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1001-02.
210. See id. at 1003.
211. See id. at 1003-04. This section's exception clearly applies only to situs crimes, but it
is not at all clear that this was the full extent of the exclusion intended by Congress, especially
considering the Supreme Court's ruling in Quiver that Congress impliedly excluded all non-
enumerated intra-tribal crimes from federal jurisdiction. See supra Part III.A.
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possession of firearms is not.212 Next, the court perfunctorily dis-
missed the argument that since possession of a firearm is a non-
enumerated crime, it laid outside federal jurisdiction. The court
stated that the M.C.A. "does not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction
of those crimes not enumerated therein; in fact, federal courts retain
jurisdiction over violations of federal laws of general, non-territorial
applicability. '213 For this fairly broad and controversial proposition,
the court cited only the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v.
Young,214 and then declared that since the crimes charged were not
enumerated in the M.C.A., it had no bearing on the outcome of the
case. 21 5  The court never considered whether the M.C.A.'s specific
treatment of intra-tribal crimes implicitly creates a special category of
criminal activity not covered by the jurisdiction of federal courts over
federal crimes. Although the Sixth Circuit inadequately addressed
the pivotal issue facing it in this case,21 6 it undoubtedly believes the
federal government has power to prosecute any generally applicable
federal offense regardless of whether it occurred on tribal lands be-
tween Indians.
C. Comparing and Contrasting the Different Approaches
The circuits all agree that Congress can change the extent of
federal jurisdiction whenever it desires, following the holding of Ka-
gama. Each also maintains that the prohibition on prosecution of
unenumerated intra-tribal crimes in the G.C.A. applies to crimes for
which location is a required element. They all agree that the United
States has the right to prosecute an intra-tribal crime as long as the
offense appears in the M.C.A. Finally, all the circuit courts accept
that the tribes have a limited degree of sovereignty, apart from the
federal government.
Despite this agreement on some basic principles and the uni-
versal recognition that Congress has unlimited power to set jurisdic-
tion in this area, the courts disagree over whether it has done so for
212. See id.
213. Id. at 1004.
214. United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991).
215. Yannott, 42 F.3d at 1004.
216. Namely, whether the federal courts should have jurisdiction over crimes which are
non-enumerated. It is clear the court missed the issue because of its complete lack of discussion
and its focus on the less complicated issue of whether this was a situs crime.
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offenses not enumerated in the M.C.A. The circuits also have not
agreed whether the prohibition contained in the G.C.A. was intended
to apply only to situs crimes, or was implicitly extended to all federal
criminal offenses perpetrated by Indians against Indians on tribal
land. Consequently, they disagree over whether the tribes have
maintained any sovereignty in the area of criminal law beyond minor
crimes and misdemeanors.
These conflicts spawned three different approaches to jurisdic-
tion over intra-tribal crimes. The Fourth Circuit simply takes at face
value the Supreme Court's century-old statement that tribes have
exclusive jurisdiction over intra-tribal Crimes.2 17  The "peculiar fed-
eral interest" doctrine advanced by the Second and Seventh Circuits,
though more progressive and flexible, may prove to be difficult to
maintain.2 18 Finally, the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits recognize
complete federal jurisdiction for generally applicable federal crimes,
reasoning that the G.C.A. and M.C.A. were designed to deal only with
enclave crimes, and therefore crimes without a situs requirement
apply to any U.S. citizen, including Indians. 219
Each of these positions has serious weaknesses. The Fourth
Circuit, which correctly cites Supreme Court case law, considers the
decisions in United States v. Antelope220 and United States v.
Wheeler 221 more clear than those cases warrant.222 It also completely
ignores various arguments offered by the other circuit courts, under-
mining the strength of its bold statement by not addressing these
legitimate points.223 The greatest weakness of the Second Circuit's
conclusion is the difficulty in applying its standard, given that any
criminal law passed by Congress presumably protects a "peculiarly
Federal" interest. Additionally, although its position is well sup-
ported by legal history, its reliance on the Wheeler footnotes is ques-
tionable. The Seventh Circuit's malleable law illustrates the pitfalls
217. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 127-72 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
221. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
222. See United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1987).
223. For instance, the decision does not address the fact that tribes may have no judicial
structure to prosecute crimes, which could leave serious crimes unpunished and unpunishable,
a concern implicit in many of the pro-federal jurisdiction decisions. See, e.g., United States v.
Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498-500 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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of the moderate position, with its last decision drawing on a broad
concept of a federal interest while also employing the language of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits regarding expanded federal jurisdiction. 224
The pro-federal side suffers from no less problematic flaws in
its logic. The Sixth Circuit missed the issue altogether, relying on the
precedent of the Ninth Circuit without doing any real analysis of its
own. 225 The Eighth Circuit made three very strong points in support
of its resolution of the issue. 226 Yet, the court used several weak ar-
guments to bolster its decision.227  The logic underlying the Ninth
Circuit's decision is also infirm because it relies on a reading of §§
1152 and 1153 together, with the result that intra-tribal crimes are
only exempt if they have situs as an element and are not covered by
the M.C.A. 228 Critically, the pro-federal decisions ignore the history of
this problem and the principle underlying Crow Dog, as later inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in Keeble, that the tribes retained sov-
ereignty over their internal affairs until Congress explicitly took
jurisdiction away.2 29 The pro-federal decisions instead apparently
start from an assumption of federal government preeminence.
230
Because each circuit has made valid arguments but still suf-
fers from oversights or deficiencies in its approach, proper resolution
of this issue requires synthesis of all the relevant factors. A fresh,
more comprehensive interpretative model that can encapsulate the
rich history of this issue and all its nuances will provide the best
solution to such a difficult problem.
224. See United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1993).
225. See United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994).
226. Namely that (1) the "peculiarly federal" model was very difficult to apply, (2) the since-
discarded assumption made at the time of the M.C.A. was that only federal enclave laws applied
to the Indians, and (3) the conviction in Quiver was based on a situs crime. See Wadena, 152
F.3d at 841-42.
227. The court stated that (1) other courts had taken a similar position, (2) the language of
the U.S. Code showed that the exception applied only to situs crimes, and (3) the government
simply had to have jurisdiction over these unenumerated crimes in order to protect the Indians
(presumably from the repercussions of their own sovereignty). See id.
228. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 498-500.
229. Cohen describes this premise in his treatise on Federal Indian Law, which until
recently was the only definitive work on the subject. As he noted, "Perhaps the most basic
principle of all Indian law.., is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not... delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." COHEN, supra note 1, at 122
(emphasis in original).
230. Relying on the origins of their precedent does not help their position, as those cases
involved perfunctory conclusions of federal jurisdiction with little or no real examination of the
problem. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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IV. MODEL FOR DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The muddled statutory interpretation performed by the cir-
cuits demands a more logical, comprehensive, and informed examina-
tion of the Indian criminal statutes, one revealed by using the com-
prehensive framework outlined by William Eskridge in his book Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation.231 This model best confronts the
problem at hand because it focuses on understanding "a text created
in the past and applying it to a present problem. '232 The foundation of
the circuit split at hand lies in a law originally passed over 110 years
ago and readopted by subsequent congresses without substantive
changes. In that time, the courts and Congress have had a number of
opportunities to reconsider the meaning and application of the law.
Traditional statutory interpretation, insofar as it does not consider all
the intricacies and history of this legal issue, is simply inadequate.
The pragmatic dynamism model of dynamic statutory interpretation,
which considers the many factors that influence a court's decision,
provides the best framework within which to analyze the problem.233
This section discusses the foundations of Eskridge's model and lays
out the framework for interpreting the statutory problem of jurisdic-
tion over intra-tribal crimes.
The nature of the political and judicial processes requires
using dynamic statutory interpretation to maintain a statute's indi-
vidual vitality over time. Because statutes are relatively difficult to
pass, they are often intentionally general and abstract, even though
courts must apply them to specific instances of fact.234 Since applica-
tion of the statute is always separated in time from passage, applica-
231. ESKRIDGE, supra note 30. Although Eskridge performs a broad normative survey of
statutory interpretation in his text, this Note employs the pragmatic dynamism portion of his
reasoning, as that part most easily transforms into a positive analysis.
232. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 616 (1988). This approach is not without criticism, most notably
leveled by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Eskridge model respects and incorporates Scalia's mode
of interpretation, but Scalia finds fault in Eskridge's additional considerations, such as imagina-
tive reconstruction. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federal-
ist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1314 n.76 (1998).
233. Eskridge describes how he thinks statutory interpretation works: the conscious
process of interpreting follows the pragmatic dynamism model, but one must also recognize the
roles of the interpreter's biases (hermeneutic dynamism) and procedure (institutional dyna-
mism). Since this Note resolves only the positive aspects of the problem, without predicting all
the factors which will influence an actual adjudication of the issue, the second two dynamics are
of little value to the analysis. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 50-80.
234. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 50.
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tion must go beyond the drafters' often narrow expectations. To solve
the problems of application, Eskridge suggests that, instead of em-
ploying a single mode of analysis, the interpreter should look at the
issue from a number of different angles to reach a solution.235 The
interpreter must remember that the drafters designed the statute to
solve a specific problem and thus should apply it to advance these
goals.23 6 However, changes in societal expectations and the legal
system necessitate some type of dynamic statutory interpretation for
statutes to remain reasonable vehicles for addressing the problems
they were designed to counter. 237
The fundamental premise of dynamic statutory interpretation
is a recognition that interpretation of statutes may change as the
context changes. The current interpreter's understanding will involve
reconciliation of three perspectives that fluctuate in importance de-
pending on the context.238 The perspectives are controlled by: (1) the
statutory text, which remains the formal focus of interpretation and a
constraint on the range of interpretive options available (textual
perspective); (2) the original legislative expectations surrounding the
statute's creation, including compromises reached (historical perspec-
tive); and (3) the evolution of the statute and its present context,
especially the ways in which the social and legal environments have
materially changed over time (evolutionary perspective). 239
Where the language of the statute is clear, the textual perspec-
tive serves as the critical component. When ambiguous language
stands amid societal norms that have changed a great deal since
passage of the law, the evolutionary perspective becomes more impor-
tant than the other two. 240 The historical perspective will play a role
when the statute's text is unclear because it helps explain what the
text meant to its authors.2 41
235. See id. at 48.
236. See id. at 51. Although application should be easy for most statutes, three circum-
stances could make application difficult: first, the legislative process might not have resolved all
the issues involved in the statute; second, the legislature might have overlooked some particular
problems; and third, the statute's implementation might meet with substantial social resistance.
See id. All three of these difficulties emerge in the Indian criminal statutes' case.
237. See id. at 52-55.
238. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 232, at 616.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
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Eskridge has observed these three perspectives in the rulings
of the Supreme Court, and after extensive study of high court deci-
sions, has been able to construct a model describing the Court's rea-
soning when dealing with problems of statutory stagnancy in the face
of changing contexts.2 42 The pragmatic dynamism model (which he
constructs as a "funnel of abstraction") takes the spectrum of insights
the Court uses and arranges them in their general hierarchical order
along the funnel. The model, as designed, looks like this:
Jurisprudential Theory Most Abstract Interpretive Inquiry
Normativisim Current Values
Evolution of Statute
Legal Process Legislative Purpose
Imaginative Reconstruction
Integration into the Structure of the Law
Liberalism Statutory Text
Most Concrete
This model suggests courts use an amorphous process in which
the interpreter thinks about the various sources of statutory meaning.
As Eskridge describes it, the interpreter will "slide up and down the
funnel... rethinking each [factor] in light of the others, and weighing
them against one another along the conventional criteria. '243 The
most concrete consideration is the statute's text (at the bottom of the
funnel), with the legislature's intent and its purpose further up.2 44
Current values are the most abstract consideration, least determina-
tive of a judicial decision in proportion to their size.245 In total, the
model suggests that when a court considers a clear text which does
not yield unreasonable results, it will give the text more weight in its
deliberations than legislative history.246 By the same token, legisla-
242. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 55-57.
243. Id. at 56.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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tive history will carry more weight relative to a current philosophy or
value. 247 The more concrete the consideration, the greater relative
weight it carries in the final interpretation.
The advantage of this model is its use of several different
approaches instead of relying strictly on one. As described by Esk-
ridge, the interpreter does not use a linear and deductive thought
process but spiral and inductive reasoning. 248 The interpreter em-
ploys society's "web of beliefs," allowing a number of interconnected
yet distinct ideas to influence the decision.2 9 A court weighs the
strengths of a number of values in the particular context when
reaching a decision, as opposed to adopting the same approach every
time, which could result in less than optimal results in a given situa-
tion, depending on a law's unique history and circumstances. 250 This
model still allows the interpreter to satisfactorily apply the statute to
situations that the text clearly addresses while enabling the inter-
preter to meet unanticipated circumstances with intelligent responses
and adaptations. 251
V. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE PROBLEM OF
INTRA-TRIBAL CRIMES
This section identifies and analyzes the factors as they appear
on the "funnel" described in the previous section, then combines the
factors, giving each due weight, in order to determine the best inter-
pretation of the reach of federal and tribal jurisdiction.
A. Textual Interpretation
As the text of any statute serves as the most concrete indicator
of the law-and has the most weight-an interpreter must consider it
first. Although both sides of this argument claim clear support in the
text,252 that the debate persists shows that the text does not prescribe
a particular result. The Fourth Circuit, relying on the Supreme
Court's early interpretation, has found that the explicit enumeration
247. See id.
248. See id. at 55.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 56.
251. See id. at 57.
252. See supra notes 123-24, 137, 178-79, 187, 194-96 and accompanying text.
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of some crimes implicitly excludes others from federal jurisdiction,
invoking a well-known canon of statutory interpretation.253 The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, by looking at the text of the M.C.A. and
G.C.A. as a unit, argue that no intra-tribal exemption from federal
jurisdiction exists outside of the context of situs crimes. 254 Such a
reading automatically grants federal jurisdiction over non-
enumerated generally applicable federal crimes by each statute's own
language (applying the law to all citizens of the U.S.). Both interpre-
tations of the text present plausible alternatives, leading to the ines-
capable conclusion that the text alone cannot resolve this issue.255
B. Integration of the Bill into Law's General Structure
Originally passed as a free-standing provision, the M.C.A. has
no surrounding text to offer help in determining its application. The
M.C.A.'s placement in the U.S. Code is equally unhelpful, as the Code
does not discernibly separate generally applicable provisions and ones
dealing with situs crimes. 256 However, both the pro-federal and the
pro-tribal jurisdiction camps have other structural arguments to
make.
The pro-federal jurisdiction camp could argue that passage of
the M.C.A. was a direct response to problems with the G.C.A., which
dealt with situs crimes only. As such, any exemption for intra-tribal
crimes that might be implied by lack of enumeration in the M.C.A.
arguably applies only to situs crimes, with no exemption for crimes of
general applicability. However, the Eighth Circuit potentially dimin-
ished the strength of this argument by noting that conventional wis-
253. See United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 463-64 (4th Cir. 1987).
254. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 841 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498-99 (9th Cir. 1994).
255. At least one commentator argues that "[ilt is an elementary principle of Indian law
that statutory ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians." Vollmann, supra note 9,
at 391 n.34 (citing Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956)). Even assuming this principle's
accuracy, resolving the ambiguity here in favor of the tribes is also problematic. Protection of
tribal sovereignty, the intuitive response, removes federal jurisdiction, which might not actually
be in the individual Indian's best interest if no viable tribal court system is in place. See supra
notes 99,109 and accompanying text. Ultimately, the best-interest question turns on whose best
interest is considered and what conception of it predominates: the individual seeking legal
protections while sacrificing tribal sovereignty or the community's interest in tribal identity and
sovereignty for its own sake.
256. For instance, kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1994), a situs crime, is followed
immediately by transportation of strikebreakers, 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994), a federal criminal law
of general applicability.
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dom at the time of the M.C.A.'s passage presumed that only situs
laws applied to the tribes. 257 If true, it is entirely plausible that Con-
gress assumed it was granting an implicit blanket exemption for any
non-enumerated intra-tribal offense by listing in the text of the
M.C.A. the only intra-tribal crimes within federal jurisdiction.
The pro-tribal jurisdiction camp could argue that the default
rule for jurisdiction favors the tribes.258 When reading this statute in
light of the general structure of the law, Congress, in its ambiguity,
let stand the default position of tribal jurisdiction. 259 At least one
commentator, citing the rejection of unlimited federal authority dur-
ing the original congressional debates, has argued that the enumera-
tion of certain offenses was not an accident but a deliberate attempt
to maintain exclusive tribal jurisdiction over the non-enumerated
offenses.26 ° Years of consistent recognition of tribal sovereignty by
both the Supreme Court and Congress 261 supports the pro-tribal posi-
tion, but this broadly conceived policy alone cannot answer the ques-
tion.
C. Imaginative Reconstruction
Imaginative reconstruction considers, essentially, what law
Congress would have enacted if it had addressed this precise ques-
tion.262  The history of the M.C.A.'s enactment is, of course, vitally
important to this reconstruction. 263 As described in Part II of this
257. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
259. The Supreme Court's declaration that Congress must explicitly state when it intends
to make any changes in the law that would encroach on tribal sovereignty strengthens this
position. See supra note 75.
260. "[T]he often ignored reason for this listing of crimes was the deliberate effort to
preserve exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over lesser offenses not covered by [the M.C.A.]. A
House amendment . . . was rejected in 1884 by the Senate before [the M.C.A.] was passed
because it would have extended total federal jurisdiction to Indian Crimes." Clinton, supra note
9, at 540 n.173 (citing 15 CONG. REC. 5802-03 (1884)).
261. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
262. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 56.
263. Although many scholars regard with skepticism the value of examining legislative
history, it is necessary here to undertake the imaginative reconstruction Eskridge suggests. As
noted before, dynamic statutory interpretation considers all viewpoints contained in society's'
"web of beliefs." Legislative history naturally falls within that web. See Wisconsin Pub. Inter-
venor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (containing language in which eight Justices
signed on to an opinion extolling the necessity of considering legislative history). When courts
recognize the dangers of legislative history and exercise care in its use, it can be a valuable tool.
See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 372 (1994).
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Note, Congress passed the M.C.A. in response to Crow Dog, reflecting
a desire to grant the federal courts at least some jurisdiction over
intra-tribal that crimes the general populace found truly atrocious. 264
The now century-old question is whether, in doing so, Congress in-
tended the enumerated offenses to represent the full extent of the
federal government's jurisdiction.
Although the legislative history shows that Congress thought
the tribes needed some control, it did not take the easy step of ex-
tending federal control to all crimes between Indians on tribal lands,
which it had power to do. Accordingly, it seems clear that Congress
did not envision omnipresent federal control over intra-tribal crimes
when it passed the M.C.A. Indeed, Congress continued to believe that
the tribes retained some sovereignty. 265 Thus, a plausible pro-tribal
construction has Congress stating that the federal government does
not have jurisdiction over non-enumerated crimes, not even generally
applicable federal crimes. 266
The pro-federals would reconstruct the actions of Congress
somewhat differently. They would concede that Congress clearly did
not intend to wipe out all tribal sovereignty when it passed the
M.C.A., but would maintain that Congress intended only an implicit
exception for situs crimes. By including Indians in federal jurisdic-
tion for 14 situs crimes, Congress meant to exclude Indians from
federal jurisdiction for only those non-enumerated crimes that had to
take place on land under exclusive federal control. In doing so, Con-
gress never even considered the question of generally applicable fed-
eral criminal statutes, which by their own terms apply to all Ameri-
cans, making no provision at all for Indians. Congress, if it consid-
ered this exact issue, would have allowed prosecution of generally
applicable federal crimes, regardless of the fact that they occurred
between Indians on tribal lands.
Recent legislative history in the reauthorization and amend-
ment of the M.C.A. offers persuasive insights to this imaginative
reconstruction problem.2 67 Language found in recent committee re-
ports on the M.C.A. gives the impression that if Congress faced the
264. See supra Part ll.B-C.
265. As noted by the Second Circuit, this was the conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Quiver. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
266. Such a conclusion would support the ruling of the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes
119-26 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part fl.D.
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specific question of federal jurisdiction over generally applicable fed-
eral criminal laws, it would have decided (at least in recent reauthori-
zations) that the tribes maintain jurisdiction unless the crime is enu-
merated or "peculiarly Federal. '268
D. Legislative Purpose
For the reasons shown above, discerning Congress's purpose
regarding the breadth of federal jurisdiction from statutes that avoid
the issue is difficult. The history of the M.C.A. clearly indicates that
Congress's purpose was to control behavior on the reservations to
some extent and grant federal authorities power to prosecute par-
ticularly troublesome crimes. 269 However, in extending federal juris-
diction in such a manner, the extent to which Congress desired to
infringe on tribal sovereignty remained unclear. The pro-federal
camp can argue that Congress sought to control all lawlessness on
tribal lands that it found particularly threatening, and therefore did
not limit jurisdiction to enumerated crimes. 270  The pro-tribal camp
can argue-with significant legal authority-that the Congressional
purpose sprang from a balancing act between traditional recognition
of tribal sovereignty and the need to placate the public's concern that
reservations not get out of control. 271 This camp can cite a number of
Supreme Court rulings that declare the tribes maintain a level of
sovereignty that can only be infringed upon by specific congressional
mandate.272 The pro-federal camp could counter that allowing Indi-
ans to retain autonomy over minor affairs did not mean that Congress
intended to waive all control outside of the M.C.A.'s explicit reach.
Although not completely clear which of these positions best represents
congressional purpose in drawing the boundaries of federal jurisdic-
tion, given the ambiguity of congressional statements and the default
268. The 1976 reauthorization committee's report noted that the tribes had jurisdiction
over crimes not specifically mentioned by the M.C.A., with two specific exceptions: (1) the reach
of Public Law 280; and (2) the "overriding exception.., for crimes that are peculiarly Federal."
See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. This language appears again in the committee
report on the amendment to the M.C.A. passed in 1986. See supra notes 96-98 and accompany-
ing text. This position comports with the rulings of the Second and Seventh Circuits. See supra
Part III.A.
269. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
270. See discussion supra Part III.B.
271. See discussion supra Part III.A.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832).
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rule of tribal jurisdiction,2 3 the pro-tribal arguments appear most
convincing.
E. Evolution of the Statute
The language of this statute has changed remarkably little
from its original form, though the list of enumerated crimes grows, a
fact which arguably supports limited federal jurisdiction. Because the
language has not changed much, considering the evolution of Indian
policy in general since the M.C.A.'s enactment can prove helpful to
determine what Congress intended in its subsequent reauthorizations
of the law, thus informing interpreters what the language means
today.
The federal government's overall policy towards the tribes,
though always somewhat paternalistic, swings along the arc of a
pendulum. From colonial times until the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the federal government did not exert much control
over intra-tribal affairs.27 4 Although it acted as a conquering power in
many respects, it did not exert substantial control over relationships
within the tribes. This pattern changed around the time of the
M.C.A. "Advocates" of the Indians insisted that integration into
Western society best served the tribes and their members. 275 With
this pressure from advocates, the federal government began to inter-
fere in tribal affairs, in many instances to eliminate traditional ways
and facilitate integration. The B.I.A. carried out this policy, with
criminal matters handled by the Courts of Indian Offenses.27 6 Typical
of the legislation of this period, Public Law 280 (passed in 1953)
wrested control of tribal affairs in some states completely from the
tribes and granted it to state governments. 277  This heavy-handed
paternalism lasted through the 1950s, when the pendulum began
swinging again toward tribal sovereignty. Over the last 30 years, an
increasing number of academics and politicians have at least given lip
273. ' The central proposition governing criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country is that
Indian tribes were once independent sovereign nations, that they retain vestiges of their
original sovereign nations, and that they have residual authority to govern their own affairs."
Vollmann, supra note 9, at 389.
274. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
276. See HARRING, supra note 39, at 182-89.
277. See supra Part II.F.
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service to the idea that tribes need and deserve greater sovereignty. 278
Nonetheless, paternalism still permeates the treatment of the tribes
in some laws, perhaps in recognition of the reality that many tribes
cannot adequately govern themselves and remain inextricably part of
the United States.279 The Indian Civil Rights Act, which extended the
Bill of Rights in statutory form to all tribes and their members, best
summarizes this new attitude.280 While this law recognized tribal
sovereignty, it imposed on tribes the traditions and standards of the
federal government. This suggests that the federal government will
allow the tribes some judicial autonomy, but only if they abide by the
generally accepted rules of the United States system.
Based on this evolution and the current state of all Indian law,
the M.C.A. logically rests in the middle ground currently occupied by
the Second and Seventh Circuits. Like much current Indian law, this
compromise position recognizes the sovereignty that the tribes pos-
sess while still protecting vital federal interests through federal
courts when the need arises. 28' Under this policy, the federal govern-
ment should generally allow tribes to handle non-enumerated offenses
but may step in when a situation threatens a peculiarly federal inter-
est.282 Reading the M.C.A. this way accurately captures the current
state of Indian law after 200 years of evolution.
278. For example, President Nixon sent a message to Congress in 1970, which stated, "Self
determination among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of
eventual termination." Federal policy sought "to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy
without threatening his sense of community." H.R. Doc. No. 363, at 2-3 (1970). See also,
Brakel, supra note 109, at 150 ('The present code words are 'self-determination' and 'retroces-
sion' of... powers and rights taken from ... the tribes in past contacts with white society.").
279. Some have even. argued that Supreme Court rulings over the last 20 years have
tended towards less tribal sovereignty and more federal control. See Erica Noonan, American
Indian activist challenges Navajo courts, AP Newswire Release, Feb. 6, 1999, available in
DIALOG.
280. See supra Part H.F.
281. This compromise has been recognized in the give and take between the courts and
Congress. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. '
282. This reading seems most in line with the intention of Congress in their recent reau-
thorizations of the M.C.A., as noted by the Second and Seventh Circuits. See supra Part II.D,
III.A.
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F. Current Societal Values
Society currently seems torn over the idea of tribal jurisdiction
and sovereignty. Academic opinion appears generally united behind
the belief that the tribes deserve more sovereignty. 2 3 Tribe members
themselves are split over the issue, wanting more autonomy while
recognizing the necessity for some federal assistance with crime con-
trol.284 The federal courts see a need to maintain fairly tight control
over crime on tribal lands, especially considering the rise of gaming
activities and the corresponding increase in tribal affluence and cor-
ruption.2 85 To resolve this issue solely on the perceived "fairness" of
recognizing tribal sovereignty, as the only other article on this subject
suggested, thus seems incredibly myopic. 28 6
Consideration of current societal values should also look at the
results of choosing one policy over another. If the tribes acquire more
sovereignty, a functioning tribal judicial system still faces several
significant obstacles. 28 7 The traditional tribal courts, where they
exist, have suffered under centuries of repression and, even if still
operative, may have difficulty being effective today. The modern
tribal courts face a plethora of problems and are far from uniform in
their ability or stability.28 8 Even where tribal courts function rela-
tively well, they still must contend with the corruption inherent in a
developing system. With the influx of gaming onto the reservations,
the most affluent members of the tribe often have the most incentive
to act corruptly. If these individuals control the tribal councils and
courts, and act opportunistically, they will compromise the tribes'
ability to maintain internal order. On the flip side of this coin, tribal
courts have a lot to offer. They give more autonomy to tribe members,
which can spawn increased community pride and self-reliance, a
283. See generally, e.g., DELORIA, supra note 42; HARRING, supra note 39. Both of these
texts, representative of recent Native American scholarship, base their conclusions on the
presumption that the tribes deserve more control over their own governance, without any
discussion of the premises of their arguments.
284. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
285. For instance, the decisions supporting federal jurisdiction discussed above are all more
recent than those supporting tribal sovereignty. See discussion supra Part III.
286. Cf. Garnett, supra note 15, at 472-74.
287. See supra Part II.E.
288. See supra notes 109 and accompanying text.
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critical step in removing tribes from their historic economic funk.289
Also, the tribal justice system has a much different approach than
European justice, focusing not on retribution but restitution.290 Such
an arrangement might arguably work better for American society as a
whole but certainly could not hurt tribal society.
Weighing all the opposing values of current society, the best
solution strikes a middle ground. Today's values, in aggregate, sup-
port federal recognition of basic tribal sovereignty, with the hope of
increasing tribal pride and reaffirming traditional values while still
maintaining the ability to step in when needed to keep corruption in
check and ensure that the United States' interests are not threatened.
The Fourth Circuit's approach misses this balance by not allowing the
federal government to protect peculiarly federal interests.291 The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits do not give enough recognition to tribal
sovereignty and thus do not promote advancement through auton-
omy.292 The Second and Seventh Circuits strike the appropriate bal-
ance, allowing for sovereignty while permitting the federal govern-
ment to protect acute federal needs. 293
G. Combination of Individual Factors and Conclusion of Analysis
The text, which could be determinative, offers no controlling
solution. The structure of the law plausibly supports either position,
but given the general recognition of tribal sovereignty by both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court, the pro-tribal camp has a better legal
argument. Imaginative reconstruction and legislative history, al-
though varied, paint a picture of Congress wanting federal control but
only when necessary to maintain order. Absent that, control should
rest with the tribes. Legislative purpose, while inconclusive, does not,
in its ambiguity, contravene the default rule of tribal sovereignty.
The evolution of Indian law over the past 200 years has seen the
government go from indifference to paternalism, and, recently, to-
wards autonomy for the tribes. This progression suggests that tribal
289. See Teresa La Fromboise & Richard La Fromboise, Critical Legal and Social Respon-
sibilities Facing Native Americans, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147, 162 (Lawrence
French ed., 1982).
290. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part III.B.
293. See supra notes 127-72 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction should be the rule, with the exception of federal interfer-
ence arising only when the government clearly demonstrates neces-
sity. Predominant modern values and the positive aspects of relying
more on the tribes favor recognizing tribal courts as partially sover-
eign, with the federal government retaining the ability to control
situations on reservations as the need arises or circumstances
threaten a particular federal interest. In light of all these factors, the
"peculiarly Federar' approach offers the best legal, ethical, and politi-
cal conclusion, respecting tribal sovereignty but allowing the federal
government some flexibility in control.
Implementing the Second Circuit's approach will have a num-
ber of positive results. It eliminates the hindrance posed to exclusive
tribal jurisdiction by the penalty limits in the Indian Civil Rights Act
by allowing the federal government to pursue prosecution when the
crime so threatens society at large that it implicates a "peculiarly
Federal" interest. Also, this approach allows tribes to develop better
court systems, which in turn will strengthen tribal governments,
allowing them to grow into effective organizations that give pride and
purpose to the Indian community. 294 Finally, it strikes a sound bal-
ance between tribal sovereignty, which Supreme Court precedent
demands, and discretionary federal government control when the
tribes inadequately handle a particular problem, something bound to
arise more frequently with the rise of Indian gaming. 295
As noted, the Second Circuit's position involves some defini-
tional problems as to what constitutes a "peculiarly Federal' inter-
est.2 96 This category potentially would encompass as far as the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits' holdings, since any law passed by Congress ar-
294. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
295. Although gaming has inarguably increased tribal wealth, it has also brought a host of
problems to tribal lands. One commentator has noted at least six negative effects of gaming on
the tribes: (1) gambling addictions; (2) the high probability of theft, embezzlement, and criminal
infiltration because the industry is cash based; (3) enormous profits undermining tribal cultural
integrity; (4) exacerbated inequalities between rural and urban tribes; (5) gaming-industry
employment requires only a low-skilled labor force, reducing the incentive for more education;
and, (6) drawing money from established tribal businesses. See Gary C. Anders, Indian Gam-
ing: Financial and Regulatory Issues, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 98, 104-05 (1998).
In this Note alone, three out of the seven cases cited involved offenses related to control of
gaming on tribal lands and crimes that resulted directly from the rise of gaming. See generally
United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d
1327 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
296. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. This is best illustrated by the evolu-
tion of the law in the Seventh Circuit.
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guably addresses a "peculiarly Federal" interest. However, this
framework recognizes tribal sovereignty as the default position, abro-
gated only if Congress has clearly stated otherwise. This puts the
burden of proof on the government to show that questionable cases
involve a "peculiarly Federal" interest. Such a system comports with
Supreme Court precedent and provides the courts some guidance,
because doubt as to whether the interest is "peculiarly Federal" places
jurisdiction with the tribes. Additionally, the legislative history-
particularly the committee reports on the 1976 reauthorization and
the 1986 amendments-gave examples of what Congress considered a
"peculiarly Federal' offense. 297 Courts will be able to examine the
facts before them and make reasoned decisions on whether the federal
government has a real need and right to maintain jurisdiction. Again,
the solution allows flexibility while creating a coherent and workable
structure for the decision-making process.
Finally, this problem has a very simple alternative solution: a
further statement by Congress. To eliminate the ambiguity, courts,
while employing the Second Circuit compromise, should at every
opportunity call for congressional action to answer this troubling legal
question. Decisions restricting jurisdiction in debatable cases will,
like Ex parte Crow Dog, serve as an implicit call for clarity. If Con-
gress answers that jurisdiction only reaches "peculiarly Federal"
offenses, courts should ask Congress to clearly annunciate the reaches
of this limitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Questions of tribal sovereignty and the relationship between
the tribes and the federal government continue to rage well over 200
years into our nation's existence. While the federal government
clearly can exert its power over the tribes at will, in some instances it
remains unclear how far that reach extends. A prime example is the
question of federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal crimes that occur on
tribal lands.
297. Specifically, they noted that "there is Federal jurisdiction when the offense is one such
as assaulting a Federal officer or defrauding the United States." H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, at 3
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127 (citations omitted).
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The circuit courts have split on the question of federal jurisdic-
tion over generally applicable federal criminal statutes as applied to
intra-tribal crimes, when those crimes are not enumerated in the
M.C.A. After considering the history and development of this law and
applying the pragmatic dynamism model of dynamic statutory inter-
pretation, the clear, logical solution to the problem is the middle
ground adopted by the Second Circuit, allowing federal jurisdiction for
non-enumerated crimes only if the offenses are "peculiarly Federal" in
nature.
James Winston King*
* This note is dedicated to Vernon King and Ellen Plunkett Smith, my academic inspirations.
Thanks to Colin Delaney, Brant Brown, and Christin Camp for their excellent editorial support.
Finally, my deepest gratitude to my parents, Jim and Jacqueline King, without whom none of
my endeavors would be possible.
1999] 1525
6
